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We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity,
but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally diﬀerent than the
solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent.
We identify a suﬃcient condition, that does not depend on the distribution of types, under
which these two solutions coincide.
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The adverse selection problem is often studied in the context of an environment where a “prin-
cipal” (she) is the residual claimant of a commodity that is produced by an “agent” (he). The
productivity parameter (type of the agent) is observed by the agent, but unknown to the princi-
pal. The principal’s task is designing an “incentive compatible” mechanism that would provide
the incentive for the agent not to imitate another type. In most adverse selection papers, the
agent is assumed to be capable of imitating any type of his choice. Yet, there is another strand
of the literature, which is based on the partial veriﬁability of the agent’s type.1 Under partial
veriﬁability, the agent is able to imitate only a subset of the other types. In this paper, we will
study a speciﬁc form of partial veriﬁability, where the agent is able to understate his type but
not able to overstate it.
In order to demonstrate how such a restriction to the agent’s imitation capacity could arise,
we will invoke the frequently used example of regulation of a monopolist. Suppose the pro-
ductivity level of the monopolist is determined by its access to certain pieces of equipment.
Suppose further that concealing some equipment is suﬃcient for an understatement of pro-
ductivity, whereas an overstatement requires disclosing an equipment that does not actually
exist. Under the standard paradigm, the monopolist is assumed to be capable of carrying out
either one of these activities costlessly. In contrast, our partial veriﬁability model depicts an
environment, where the concealment of an existing equipment is costless but disclosure of a
non-existing equipment is prohibitively costly.2
Elimination of the agent’s ability to overstate his type enlarges the set of incentive com-
patible mechanisms for the principal. Therefore it introduces the potential of improving the
principal’s rent extraction from the agent. In this paper, we present a suﬃcient condition for
the elimination of overstatements not to change the principal’s maximized payoﬀ. This condi-
tion depends on how the value and the cost of production change with productivity, but unlike
1the widely used “regularity” conditions, does not depend on the distribution of productivity.
One result that is directly related to the current analysis is provided by Moore (1984). In
an auction environment, where the principal is a seller and the agent is a buyer whose valuation
for the object depends on his type, Moore shows that removing the agent’s ability to imitate
higher valuation types does not change the optimal solution to the principal’s expected revenue
maximization problem (his Theorem 1).3 We diverge from Moore’s setup by allowing for the
principal’s payoﬀ to depend on the agent’s type as well as the output level. The suﬃcient
condition we identify is weaker than assuming that the principal’s payoﬀ is not responsive to
the agent’s type.
2 The Model
The principal is the residual claimant of the production, and the agent incurs the production
costs. The principal can commit to a contract that assigns output and transfer levels to messages
sent by the agent. Both players have utility functions quasilinear in money.
We assume a discrete type space for the agent, {1,2,...,N}.L e tn be the generic element of
this set. fn is the prior probability that the agent’s type is n. Fn =
P
i≤n fi is the cumulative
distribution function associated with {fn}. The cost of producing x units of output when the
type is n is c(x,n). This cost function is strictly increasing, convex, diﬀerentiable in x and
strictly decreasing in n. We also make the following “sorting” assumption:
c(x,n) − c(x,n +1 ) i si n c r e a s i n gi nx for all n. (1)
Note that the sorting condition can also be written as c1 (x,n) is declining in n for all x,w h e r e
the subscript 1 after a function indicates the derivative with respect to its ﬁrst argument.
The value of production of x units of output for the principal is v(x,n), provided that the
type of the agent is n. This function is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and diﬀerentiable
in x. Note that we are not stating any speciﬁcation regarding the dependence of the function
2v(x,n) on the agent’s type n. Finally, to guarantee that the optimization problems we will
introduce have solutions, we assume that for all n, v1 (x,n)−c1 (x,n) approaches to a negative
number (or to −∞)a sx tends to inﬁnity.
If the type of the agent were known by the principal, the optimal mechanism would require
maximizing the value of production net of the production cost. Accordingly, x
fb
n ,t h e“ ﬁrst
best” output level for type n is deﬁned as x
fb
n ∈ argmaxx {v(x,n) − c(x,n)}.4
We will start with stating the standard problem that an uninformed principal faces, when
the agent is capable of imitating any type of his choice. This problem can be formulated as
choosing the utility and output levels for each type such that there exists no type willing to
imitate another one, and all types are given a non-negative utility level. Let un and xn represent






fn (v(xn,n) − c(xn,n) − un)s . t .
IC(m|n):un ≥ um + c(xm,m) − c(xm,n) for all m,all n
IR(n):un ≥ 0 for all n
where IC stands for “incentive compatibility” and IR stands for “individual rationality.”
One immediate implication of the incentive compatibility constraints is the monotonicity of
the output levels in the productivity of the agents, i.e., xn+1 ≥ xn for all n<N .B y u s i n g
this monotonicity requirement and the sorting condition on the cost function, one can show
that the only relevant constraints of Program A1 are the “downward adjacent” IC constraints,
the IR constraint of the least productive type, and the monotonicity constraints. Accordingly,






fn (v(xn,n) − c(xn,n) − un)s . t .
IC(n|n +1 ) : un+1 ≥ un + c(xn,n) − c(xn,n+1 ) f o rn<N
IR(1) : u1 ≥ 0
xn+1 ≥ xn for n<N
At the solution to Program A2, constraints IC(n|n +1 ) f o r n<Nand IR(1) are always
binding. If we ignore the monotonicity constraints, the output levels to maximize the objective
function are identiﬁed as x∗





v(x,n) − c(x,n) − 1−Fn
fn [c(x,n) − c(x,n +1 ) ]f o rn<N
v(x,n) − c(x,n)f o rn = N.
Most researchers assume “regularity” conditions which secure that {x∗
n} satisﬁes the monotonic-
ity constraints and therefore constitutes an optimal output proﬁle.5 If the regularity conditions
hold and {x∗
n} is indeed a solution to Programs A1 and A2, removing the upward IC constraints
(or removing all the IC constraints other than the downward adjacent ones) would not change
the optimal solution to the problem. Notice that, since P (x,n)i n v o l v e st h et e r m sFn and fn,
any such regularity conditions require assumptions on the distribution function.
On the other hand, if {x∗
n} is not monotonic and therefore is not an optimal output pro-
ﬁle, then the monotonicity constraints are relevant for Program A2.6 For the purpose of this
paper, what is signiﬁcant about this case is that the removal of the upward IC constraints
might improve the principal’s rent extraction. Monotonicity is a joint implication of all the IC
constraints, both the upward and the downward ones. Hence the principal is able to implement
non-monotonic output proﬁles if upward IC constraints are eliminated. In what follows, we
will not introduce any restrictions on the distribution of types. Therefore we will not be able
rule out the case where monotonicity constraints are relevant for Program A2. However, we will
present an alternative condition, which does not depend on the type distribution, but which
4guarantees that removing the upward IC constraints would not change the optimal solution to
the mechanism design problem.
3 The Modiﬁed Problem
In this section, we consider the modiﬁcation of Program A1, where the agent is able to under-






fn (v(xn,n) − c(xn,n) − un)s . t .
IC(m|n):un ≥ um + c(xm,m) − c(xm,n)f o rm<n , for all n
IR(n):un ≥ 0 for all n
The only IC constraints for Program B1 are the downward IC constraints. In order to induce
the truthful revelation of the type, it is suﬃcient for the principal to make sure that there exists
no type who is willing to imitate a less productive one.7 As a ﬁrst step to the simpliﬁcation of
the set of constraints for Program B1, we will deﬁne the function ˜ n(·)a s






for a given output proﬁle {xn}.T h a ti s ,˜ n(n) is the type which is associated with the highest
production level among the types weakly smaller than n. If there are more than one such type,
˜ n(n) represents the highest one among them. Note that ˜ n(·) is a weakly increasing function.
˜ n(n) takes the value of n if and only if xn ≥ x˜ n(n−1), otherwise ˜ n(n)=˜ n(n − 1). Also note
that {xn} is monotonic if and only if ˜ n(n)=n for all n.
Now we will introduce a simpler variant of Program B1 by removing all the constraints






fn (v(xn,n) − c(xn,n) − un)s . t .
IC(˜ n(n)|n +1 ) : un+1 ≥ u˜ n(n) + c
¡







IR(1) : u1 ≥ 0
Proposition 1 The solutions to programs B1 and B2 are equivalent.
Proof. We need to establish that the solution to B2 satisﬁes the constraints of B1. First,
we will show that the solution to B2 satisﬁes certain equations. Then we will show that those
equations imply the constraints of B1.
Step 1: The solution to B2 satisﬁes









To see this, ﬁrst note that at the solution to B2, all constraints of B2 must be binding.
Otherwise by reducing the value of some un, we could increase the value of the objective
function without violating any of the constraints. To show that C (n +1 )i ss a t i s ﬁed, there are
two cases two consider. If ˜ n(n)=n,t h e nC (n + 1) is implied by the binding IC(˜ n(n)|n +1 )
constraint. If ˜ n(n)=˜ n(n − 1), then with a change of variables, we can rewrite the binding
IC(˜ n(n − 1)|n)c o n s t r a i n ta s
un = u˜ n(n) + c
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= u˜ n(n) + c
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It follows from the binding IC(˜ n(n)|n + 1) constraint again that the right hand side of this
last equation is equal to un+1. Therefore, C (n + 1) holds for this case as well.
Step 2: IR(1) and C (n +1 )for all n<N imply the constraints of B1.
6C (n + 1) for all n<Nimply un is increasing in n.T h e r e f o r e IR(1) is suﬃcient for the
other IR constraints. To see that downward IC constraints are satisﬁed, let n and m be two
types such that n>m . Sum up equations C (n)t oC (m +1 )t og e t
































By deﬁnition of ˜ n(·), we know that x˜ n(i) is larger than xm for all i larger than m. IC(m|n)
follows from the above equation and the sorting condition (1). Since n and m are arbitrarily
chosen, any downward IC constraint is an implication of C (n + 1) for all n<N.
Unlike in Program A2, where the focus is on the downward adjacent type, in Program B2
the principal has to provide the incentive not to imitate the type that produces the highest
output level among the less productive types. This points to an important distinction of our
modiﬁed problem. The relevant IC constraints of Program B1 are endogenously determined
by the output proﬁle {xn}. The exogenous ordering of the types does not reveal the relevant
constraints in the absence of the upward IC constraints. In essence, the modiﬁed problem here
is similar to the design problems, where the global incentive constraints are relevant as well as
the local ones. (See Moore (1984, 1988), and Matthews and Moore (1987).)
We will close this section by presenting two properties of the solution to Program B1.
Lemma 1 If {xn} is the output proﬁle that solves Program B1 (and B2), then
i) xn ≤ xfb
n for all n.
ii) xn = xfb
n for n such that ˜ n(n) <n .
Proof. i) Consider the solution to B1. From the sorting condition, the right hand sides of
the IC constraints are increasing in output levels. Suppose there exists n such that xn >x
fb
n .
Replace xn with x
fb
n . The constraints of the problem are still satisﬁed. The objective function
is higher. Contradiction.
7ii) Consider the solution to B2. Suppose there exists n such that ˜ n(n) <nand xn <x
fb
n .
Increase xn in such a way that it is still smaller than x˜ n(n) and x
fb
n . There is no change in the
right hand sides of the IC constraints. The objective function is higher. Contradiction.
4A S u ﬃcient Condition
Consider the following example, where there are 3 possible types of the agent with f1 = 3
4 and
f2 = f3 = 1
8. The principal’s value and the agent’s cost functions are respectively v(x,n)=
vn lnx and c(x,n)=cnx,w h e r evn and cn are given below:
c1 =3 c2 =2 c3 =1




x is decreasing in n and 1−Fn
fn is non-monotonic, this example does not satisfy
the regularity conditions stated in footnote 5. The solution to Program A1 requires “bunching”
types 1 and 2, with the optimal output levels x1 = x2 =2 .65, and x3 = 4. It is worth noting that
constraint IC(2|1), an upward adjacent incentive compatibility constraint, is binding at this
solution. Therefore we cannot immediately conclude that removal of the upward IC constraints
would not change the optimal output levels. However, due to the small number of types in this
example, we can provide a solution to Program B1 without much diﬃculty and observe that it
is the same as the solution to Program A1. Even though IC(2|1) is removed from the set of
constraints, IC(1|3), a downward “non-adjacent” constraint comes into eﬀe c ta n dt h ep r i n c i p a l
still chooses the same outcome in the less constrained environment.
This example introduces the possibility that solutions to Programs A1 and B1 may be
equivalent even when the monotonicity constraints are relevant for Program A2. With the







is weakly increasing, then the solution to Program B1 (B2) is equiv-
alent to the solution to Program A1 (A2).
8Proof. To prove the proposition, it suﬃces to show that the solution to B2 satisﬁes the
constraints of A2, i.e., ˜ n(n)=n for all n. Suppose there exists m, such that ˜ n(m) <m .T h i s
implies xm = x
fb
m. It follows from x˜ n(m) ≤ x
fb






that x˜ n(m) ≤ xm,
which is a contradiction to the deﬁnition of function ˜ n(·).




2 =3 .5, x
fb
3 =4 )s a t i s f yt h e
suﬃcient condition stated in Proposition 2. This conﬁrms our initial ﬁnding that Programs
A1 and B1 yield the same solutions for this example. Moreover, since this suﬃcient condition
does not depend on the type distribution, the equivalence of the solutions would persist under
diﬀerent values for f1, f2,a n df3.
On the other hand, if the ﬁrst best output levels are not weakly increasing, solutions to
Programs A1 and B1 could diﬀer. To see this, consider a variant of the above example, where
v2 equals 5, instead of 7. Now, x
fb
2 equals 2.5a n dt h eﬁr s tb e s to u t p u tl e v e l sa r en o tw e a k l y
increasing any more. The solution to Program A1 would still involve bunching with the optimal
output levels x1 = x2 =2 .56, and x3 = 4. But the solution to Program B1 is diﬀerent and
yields a higher payoﬀ for the principal with the output levels x1 =2 .57, x2 =2 .5, and x3 =4 . 8
Finally, we turn our attention to a condition that would guarantee that the ﬁrst best output
levels are weakly increasing. If the marginal value of production, v1 (·,n), is weakly increasing
in n then the ﬁrst best output levels are weakly increasing as well.9 A special case of this
condition would be the value of production not being responsive to the type of the agent at all.
The corollary below follows from this observation.
Corollary 1 (Moore (1984)) If v(·,n)=v(·,m) for all n and m, then the solution to Program
B1 (B2) is equivalent to the solution to Program A1 (A2).
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10Notes
1See Green and Laﬀont (1986), Deneckere and Severinov (2001). Also see Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (1995) for a model of costly misreporting.
2Alternatively, the regulator could be inspecting the proﬁt generated by the monopolist
rather than its access to equipment. In that case, our model would be describing a situation,
where the monopolist can hide a portion of the proﬁts but cannot inﬂate them. For simi-
lar assumptions, see Hurwicz et al. (1995), Hong and Page (1995) on partial veriﬁability of
endowments; and Beaudry and Blackorby (2000) on partial veriﬁability of market productivity.
3Moore (1984) employs this result in his characterization of the optimal auction with risk
aversion. Matthews and Moore (1987), and Moore (1988) apply a similar methodology to study
(i) a monopolist’s optimal menu of quality - warranty pairs, and (ii) the second best contract
between a buyer and a seller respectively.
4Strict concavity of v(·,n)a n dc o n v e x i t yo fc(·,n)i m p l yt h a tx
fb
n is unique.
5The following set of assumptions would do the trick: (i) v1 (x,n)i si n c r e a s i n gi nn,( i i )
c1 (x,n)−c1 (x,n +1 )i sd e c r e a s i n gi nn, (iii) the hazard rate of the distribution is monotonic,
i.e., 1−Fn
fn is decreasing in n.
6In that case, providing a solution to Programs A1 and A2 is a slightly more involved process.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) outline this process for a model with continuous type space in the
appendix to Chapter 7.
7One note is in order to justify our implicit reliance on the revelation principle. Since our
assumptions on the agent’s capacity to imitate other types satisfy the “nested range condition,”
i.e., since an agent who can imitate type n can also imitate all the other types that can be
imitated by type n,i tf o l l o w sf r o mG r e e na n dL a ﬀont (1986) that any implementable outcome
11is implementable through truthful equilibria of direct mechanisms.
8To see how the removal of the upward IC constraints helps in this variant of the example,
note that the solution to Program A1 exhibits an “upward distortion” in the output levels.
That is, the optimal level of x2 is higher than its ﬁrst best level. If the principal could reduce
x2 without changing the other output levels, she would have increased her expected payoﬀ.
However, such a reduction in x2 violates the constraints of Program A1, since it would make
imitating type 2 optimal for type 1. In contrast, since the upward IC constraints are not
present in Program B1, the principal could reduce the output level for type 2 without fearing
that type 1 could imitate type 2. When the ﬁrst best output levels are weakly increasing, such
upward distortions are ruled out in the solution to Program A1.
9Note that this condition is not a necessary condition. The example we provide above have
weakly increasing ﬁrst best output levels even though v1 (·,n) is decreasing in n.
12